How Much Does it Cost the US to Police the Globe
Just how much does it cost for our American empire to police and defend us along with our allies? To look into how much it costs we must first look into how much the 9/11 terrorist attacks cost us. It has demolished our nations tourist market all airlines are loosing millions of dollars and laying off thousands of people. Companies like Boeing have lain off 35,000 employees. The attacks didn’t come at a very good time because we were on our way into an economical recession because of many major businesses going under. Businesses that live off tourism like theme parks were hit very hard as well (bearanyburden.com 1).The cost of War On Terror has so far cost $65 billion ($30 billion for Afghanistan, rest for homeland defense) in direct costs. Historically, this is not a big war. Defense spending in the next year will be under four percent of GDP. During World War II, it was ten times that. At the end of the Korean War, defense spending was 15 percent of GDP. During the height of the Vietnam War, defense spending was 9.2 percent of GDP. Our peak spending during the Cold War (without a major war) was 6.5 percent of GPD in 1986. Despite the relatively small number of troops in the combat zone, and, historically, very low casualties, the population still maintains a healthy fear and respect for combat operations. Although the direct costs of war in Iraq will probably not be that great, although it will cost the American taxpayer more than the 1991 Gulf War did ($80 billion 2003 dollars.) The 1991 costs were largely covered by contributions from nations that could not, or would not, contribute a lot of troops. Actually, because of the sensationalistic way "war costs" are calculated, we actually made money on the 1991 Gulf War. What many forget is that the only real cost is the additional cost above what you would be spending on these troops anyway. Even mobilizing reserves is not all that expensive, as thousands are mobilized in a normal year for special training, and these reserve troops are paid on the same wage and benefit scales as the active duty troops. The biggest chunk of additional expense is transportation (mainly air and sea) and temporary housing (mostly tents in the Persian Gulf) for the troops deployed. Ammunition costs are going down, largely because of smart bombs and better methods of using them. Most of the American military activity in the Persian Gulf so far is what would normally be spent on overseas training exercises. But as the latest group of troops heads out there, and the number of American military personnel hits 150,000 in February, the costs go up. But that force will still be only 30 percent of what we used in 1991. Less than a quarter of the reservists have been called up, compared to 1991. As for lengthily occupation costs, let us not forget that Iraq has a hundred billion barrels of proven oil reserves, and a need to cut government corruption and misapplication of oil revenues. U.S. administration would rapidly increase the living standard of Iraqis and pay for a lot of the occupying forces costs (who could be billeted in newly built barracks that would eventually be turned over to the new Iraq army.) (strategypage.com 1).
Imagine the costs of war as a series of boxes nested inside each other. The innermost box is U.S. costs in Iraq, which received growing public attention in 2003, especially as postwar security and reconstruction costs mounted. But Iraq is just, as President Bush says, a “battle.” It is contained in a much larger box, the War on Terror, which also contains military operations in Afghanistan, worldwide counter terrorism efforts, CIA covert actions, homeland security, and possibly future wars in places like North Korea. In turn, the War on Terror is nested in a much larger box, which I call U.S. government “war-related spending.” In addition to the War on Terror, this war-related spending includes “peacetime” military forces – baseline costs to maintain standing military forces – veterans’ benefits, and the interest on past war debts. The even larger box within which the government’s war-related spending is nested, I call the “real price of war.” It includes costs to the economy from the disruption and destruction caused by wartime, from the growing national debt, from indirect impacts on state and local governments, and from inflation – the ultimate war tax throughout history. I will summarize this largest box toward the end of the chapter. But first I will tally up the costs that are easier to count – the government’s war-related spending – showing what expenses go into that total including Iraq, the War on Terror, and other government expenditures.
To look at the cost from a household perspective think of having a meter that charged you a quarter for twenty minutes of protection. The quarters would add up to about five hundred dollars per month. It cost our nation hundred of billion of dollars per year. To look at it in simpler terms take a ten-dollar bill out of your wallet and that equals about one billion for the government. So these eighty billion dollars that Bush wants to put towards the war is like eight hundred dollars to a normal household. The total defense budget right now is four hundred billion dollars. This is the DOD budget and only makes up for 2/3 of the real spending. Another thirty five billion is spent on the new Department of Homeland Security. (bearanyburden.com 1).
[To look into the exact numbers one must search into our governments official website. These figures and numbers were taken exactly as the US government released them].
“WASHINGTON, Feb. 4, 2002 -- President Bush is asking for a fiscal 2003 defense budget of $379.4 billion, an increase of $48 billion over the fiscal 2002 budget.
The request funds the war on terrorism, increases DoD funds spent on homeland security and begins financing transformation for the U.S. military to face the challenges of the 21st century. The DoD budget is 16.9 percent of the total federal budget request.
Operations and maintenance funds -- key indicators of readiness -- also rise. Money for flying hours, Army operations tempo, ship steaming days, depot maintenance and training are all up. Total O&M spending is set at $150.4 billion.
Active duty end strength is set at 1,389,700 service members. Reserve component end strength is set at 864,600.
Military personnel would receive a 4.1 percent pay raise if Congress approves the request. Civilian workers are slated for a 2.6 percent raise.
Under the proposal, the Army would receive $90.9 billion; the Navy and Marine Corps, $108.3 billion; and the Air Force, $107 billion. The request pegs defense wide spending at $52.9 billion. The Defense Emergency Response Fund is set at $20.1 billion.
A senior defense official said the budget would allow the U.S. military to continue the war on terrorism. All told, money for the war is set at $27.2 billion in fiscal 2003. A total of $10 billion is allocated to help DoD plan for whatever phase of the war on terrorism comes next. "We don't know what we will be doing in a year, but we know we will be involved in the war," the official said.
DoD estimates the current cost of the war in Afghanistan at around $8 billion.
The money also goes to increasing protection of the United States. More than $1.2 billion is set for continued combat air patrols over the United States and $3 billion is earmarked for counter terrorism, force protection and other homeland security needs.
Quality of life accounts for military personnel have been beefed up. Besides the pay raise, the Bush administration also seeks another targeted pay raise for mid-career officer and enlisted force that would increase pay for some ranks by another 2 percent.
The Basic Allowance for Housing program would continue to cut military members' out-of-pocket housing expenses -- from 11.3 percent now down to 7.5 percent in fiscal 2003.
The request would fully fund military healthcare including the TRICARE for Life program for military retirees over age 65. The budget anticipates pharmacy costs growing by 15 percent, managed care support contracts by 12 percent and military treatment facilities, 6.2 percent. All told, healthcare costs are pegged at $22.1 billion in fiscal 2003.
Defense planners also asked for $4.2 billion to improve military housing, including money to expand the military housing privatization fund. This would put the department on track to eliminate most inadequate housing by fiscal 2007 instead of fiscal 2010.
While family housing funds have gone up, military construction monies have dropped from $6.5 billion in fiscal 2002 to $4.8 billion in 2003. While some quality of life construction will continue -- most notably 46 new barracks, childcare centers and physical fitness facilities -- most of the money will go to sustain existing facilities.
The reason for the construction cut is the next round of base closures is set for fiscal 2005. In the meantime, DoD must maintain its bases and cannot "pre-select" the ones it thinks are likely to be closed. Rather than risk building new facilities on bases that may be closed, DoD officials chose to delay as many projects as possible until after the closure decisions in 2005.
In announcing the fiscal 2002 budget last year, Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld said the 2003 budget would introduce major transformation trends. He said in a Jan. 31 speech to National Defense University students that the United States cannot afford to fight the war on terrorism and ignore the force of the future.
The request supports converting four Trident submarines to cruise missile carriers. It also seeks to capitalize on U.S. asymmetric advantages in developing new classes of satellites -- including a space-based radar -- and improving existing capabilities and hardening them against attack.
The budget would initiate development of the DD(X) surface warfare ship, a test bed for future Navy systems, a senior defense official said. Plans are to insert and test new stealth and propulsion technologies in the DD(X) and to test new manning programs. The budget request asks for $961 million for this effort.
Unmanned vehicles are also transformational. The department wants to spend $1 billion to go to procurement and research of unmanned aerial vehicles. DoD wants to spend $154.1 million to buy and arm 22 Air Force Predator UAVs in fiscal 2003. The Air Force has also allocated $170.8 million for three Global Hawk UAVs. There is another $100.7 million set aside to buy 12 Army Shadow UAVs.
In addition, DoD would accelerate funding of Global Hawk research and the Navy's Fire Scout UAV. The request also accelerates research in unmanned combat aerial vehicles. "These UCAVs are not just UAVs with weapons added," said the official. "They are combat airplanes built from the ground up, just without pilots." The request also increased funding for unmanned underwater vehicles.
The old strategic nuclear Triad -- land-based ICBMs, manned aircraft, and submarine-launched ballistic missiles -- would begin transformation with this budget. President Bush has announced plans to reduce offensive nuclear warheads from 6,000 to between 1,700 and 2,200. The new Triad is the scaled-down nuclear deterrent, a more deadly and responsive conventional deterrent, and missile defense.
Procurement reaches a new high with this budget, in the realm of funding officials believe is needed to transform the force. The overall procurement budget is set at about $72 billion. The Army is set for $13.8 billion, the Navy/Marine Corps for $24.9 billion, the Air Force at $27.3 billion, and $2.8 billion for defense wide buys. There is also $3.2 billion in the Defense Emergency Response Fund.
The budget for research, development, testing and evaluation is set for $53.9 billion in fiscal 2003, up from $48.4 billion this year. This would continue development of the Joint Strike Fighter and accelerate special operations capability. It also funds the restructured V-22 Osprey program.
Science and technology funding rose a billion dollars in this request to $9.9 billion, or 2.7 percent of the DoD budget topline. The money would fund Army research in future combat systems, medical technology and other basic research. Navy funds would go to mine warfare and mine countermeasures, undersea systems and basic research. The Air Force would look at directed energy, aircraft propulsion and uses of space.
The department has canceled a number of programs and shifted almost $10 billion to other projects. DoD ended programs it deemed out of line with transformation strategy. These include the Navy DD-21 destroyer and Theater Area Missile Defense programs, the Air Force Peacekeeper missile program and 18 Army "legacy" programs. The services would retire some older systems faster, such as older F-14 Tomcats, Vietnam-era UH-1 helicopters and the Navy's Spruance destroyer class.
Other highlights of the budget request are:
· The fiscal 2003 request includes $707 million for the Army's Future Combat System. In addition, the Army would buy 332 interim armored vehicles and 5,631 M-16 rifles. The request budgets $910.2 million for continued development of the RAH-66 Comanche helicopter
(defenselink.mil 1)
[Now we have an idea as to what the government thinks it will cost but what exactly do they wish to accomplish. This is an interview given to a commissioner on a terrorist attack-preventing group].
Challenges within the Muslim World
Chairman
Kean, Vice Chairman Hamilton, Board of Commissioners, and thank you for the
invitation to speak before the 9-11 Commission about the challenges confronting
the United States in the Muslim world. As you may know, I co-directed Guiding
Principles for U.S. Post-Conflict Policy in Iraq, a December 2002 report
co-sponsored by the Council on Foreign Relations and the James A. Baker III
Institute for Public Policy. Ambassadors Edward P. Djerejian and Frank G.
Wisner co-chaired the report. In addition, during "Operation Iraqi
Freedom," and the weeks prior to it, I traveled twice to the Persian Gulf
to discuss the war, its aftermath, and American foreign policy with those in
the region. Although the Council on Foreign Relations makes my research
possible, it bears no responsibility for these remarks
While much
public attention has focused on the question of whether we are now embarked
upon a "clash of civilizations," I would like to offer an alternative
lens to view the current crisis. Today, America is involved in a political and
economic struggle, rather than a cultural one. This, in many ways, is good
news. It is much easier to respond to political and economic challenges than to
overcome cultural differences. But it is not a palliative. Many of our
political and economic policies are the result of decades of hard work, careful
consideration, and evolving political realities. They have been constructed for
good reason and have strong domestic support. Acknowledging that our policies have
caused, and are causing, friction does not offer immediate, ready-made policy
options.
I bring to
you today no easy solutions. In the Middle East, political and economic
problems are becoming entwined with faith and national identity. It makes it
feel as if we are engaged in a clash of civilizations. But if we allow this
superficial understanding to take root within American policy toward the Arab
and Muslim world, we will create a self-fulfilling prophecy. We will abandon
the dwindling number of American supporters in the region; those who cling to
the ideals America espouses and silently root for our victory over the radical
Islamic groups that are systematically destroying centuries of culture and
progress. We will hand a victory to our enemies who would like nothing more
than to see the wrath of America turned against Arab/Islamic civilization. We
will become complacent, believing that policy options simply do not exist. We
must avoid this at all costs.
After September
11th, Americans fully confronted the rage and humiliation experienced by many
in the Arab and Islamic world. But anti-Americanism had been on the rise before
the terrorist attacks. In a prescient article written in summer 2000 entitled
"The World's Resentment" Peter Rodman, now Assistant Secretary of
Defense for International Security Affairs, suggested that rising resentment
was inevitable, healthy and something we could do little about.
What was not
expected was how quickly genuine support for America would sink. A recent PEW
survey found that in Indonesia those viewing the US favorably fell from 61% to
15% over the course of the past year. In Turkey, 71% of the population is
worried that their country will be the target of an American attack. Anti-Americanism
has become the flavor of the day in the political circles of America's closest
friends such as South Korea and Germany, as well as in the capitals of other
traditional partners like Saudi Arabia. A majority of respondents in five of
seven NATO countries support a more independent relationship with the United
States. According to the same poll "the bottom has fallen out of support
for America in most of the Muslim world." Far are we from the day in 1962
when Prince (later King) Faisal of Saudi Arabia told President Kennedy,
"After Allah, we trust the United States."
Radical
Islamic groups are setting the parameters of local debate, even as they offer
fewer and fewer political solutions. Their ardent anti-Americanism receives a
receptive audience throughout the Arab and Islamic world. After September 11th,
finding ways to reverse this appeal and re-attract America's supporters is an
urgent foreign policy priority.
Today's
fight against al-Qa'eda and other Islamic radical groups flows directly from
policy choices American decision makers and their Middle Eastern counterparts
made in order to win the Cold War. In Afghanistan in the 1980s, American
leaders were convinced that bringing down the Soviet Union was worth the costs of
empowering religious radicals. In the words of Zbigniew Brzezinski, "What
was more important in the world view of history? The Taliban or the fall of the
Soviet Empire? A few stirred-up Muslims or the liberation of Central Europe and
the end of the Cold War?" Had our leaders known that the cost of bringing
down the Soviets would be over 3,000 dead Americans, the destruction of New
York's World Trade Center, an attack on the Pentagon, simultaneous embassy
bombings in Africa, the destruction of the USS Cole and radical cells sprinkled
across the globe operating against the United States, it is almost certain that
they still would have deemed the costs acceptable.
During the
Cold War the United States also chose a strategy of working alongside states
for geo-political reasons, rather than ideological compatibility. Determined
not to recreate the British imperial experience, the United States steadfastly
refused to pressure allies too hard on domestic reforms. As early as the 1950s,
Britain's Foreign Secretary and Foreign Minister were beseeching the United
States to use its influence to press the ruling Saudi family on their domestic
and foreign policy. The United States steadfastly refused. Eventually, Islamic
radicals such as Egypt's Ayman al-Zawahiri, Osama bin Laden's right hand man,
used such refusal against the United States in order to draw recruits to their
cause. Zawahiri's argument that "the U.S. claims to stand for human rights
and democracy [but] forces corrupt regimes on the Muslim world" resonates
with citizens throughout the region.
The lack of
imperial design also allowed the United States to quickly abandon countries
like Afghanistan and Pakistan when the Cold War ended. As neither Pakistan nor
Afghanistan were pressing geo-political concerns in the new world order, the US
withdrew most of its presence from both countries. It left behind divided
fractured countries awash with weapons and in the grips of state collapse. The
environment provided fertile ground for organizing an anti-western crusade.
More
recently, policies designed to restrain Saddam Hussein deeply damaged American
standing in the Middle East in general, and in the Gulf in particular. In the
early 1990s the Clinton Administration engaged in a policy of "Dual
Containment" against Iran and Iraq. Washington was forced to rely heavily
on Turkey, Saudi Arabia, and the Arab Gulf States. The willingness to allow
Saddam Hussein to stay "in his box" while millions of Iraqis suffered
severe deprivation, had a profoundly negative effect on America's regional
standing. Statements that 'the containment of Iraq was worth the lives of half
a million Iraqi children' ricocheted throughout the Arab world and provided
grist for America's critics. Worse, the inability to bolster American military
presence with social or economic policies that addressed pressing local
problems led many in the region to ask "where, if anywhere, is American
policy taking us." Anti-Americanism did not begin after September 11th. It
had been steadily growing in the Gulf for a decade.
Our Middle
Eastern partners have made their own set of choices that have allowed radical
Islamic groups to flourish. During the 1970s and 1980s leaderships across the
region chose to fund local Islamic opponents who were also at odds with the
regimes' more secular political opposition. For example, during the first
Intifada, Israel supported radical Islamic groups as a counter to the
Palestinian Liberation Organization (PLO), which the Israelis considered far
more dangerous. Egypt's President Anwar Sadat did the same in Egypt in order to
counter his secular rivals. The policy was mimicked in Tunisia.
Radical
Islamic movements were further strengthened by the economic windfall Arab Gulf
states accrued from high oil prices in the 1970s, the Iranian revolution (and
Saudi response to it) and the return of the "Afghan Arabs" in the
late 1980s and early 1990s. Gulf Arabs poured significant resources into
schools and mosques across the globe but then failed to restrain what was being
taught. Saudi Arabia sent significant funds to Pakistan, Afghanistan and
eventually Central Asia, Africa, and beyond. In addition, in Afghanistan during
the 1980s, the Saudis matched American covert funding in Afghanistan
"dollar for dollar" in the fight against the "godless"
communists.
Many Middle
Eastern states used this growing Islamic opposition, which they had originally
encouraged, as an excuse for enacting emergency decrees and erasing civil
liberties, further motivating religious opposition. The result has been
increasingly authoritarian states that are challenged by the most venal
religious opposition. The United States has also become a target as it is the
key backer of such regimes. Since the press in most of the Arab world is dissuaded
from directly criticizing their local regimes, America is also often to be used
as a synonym for the regime itself.
American and
Middle Eastern policies have contributed to the very real challenges we face
today in the Muslim world. New policies are required to reverse mounting anger
and rage. While we cannot and should not expect to attract the good will of the
entire population, especially of the violent fringe, we must try to win back
some of the good will that existed toward the United States in the days
immediately after September 11th and during the early 1990s. This is a battle
for the political center. And at the moment, we are losing. Several policy
areas require urgent attention.
(1)
Engaging the Israelis and Palestinians
Active
American involvement in the peace process will help reduce the appeal of
Islamic radicals. Such groups feed off the seemingly endless violence. The
conflict fuels protests, demonstrations and anti-U.S. sentiment throughout the
Arab and Muslim world. Moderates throughout the region regularly advise that
tamping down the violence would significantly help their cause.
The
President deserves credit for realizing the importance of engaging his
Administration directly in the peace process. His promise of a free trade
agreement for the region was creative and helpful. The Administration however
does not seem to have contingency plans for when radical groups attempt to
thwart progress. Secretary of State Colin Powell's response of "I hope
not," to Charlie Gibson's question "one very significant incident,
and doesn't the entire roadmap come apart?" did not provide much
assurance. Such contingencies will be needed, as violent challenges to the
process are predictable.
The contours
of a final settlement were drawn for us at Camp David and Taba. While we cannot
drag the parties back to where they were, we can serve as a catalyst for
change. And that is a role we should whole-heartedly embrace.
(2)
Committing to Nation building
The world
watched overwhelming American power defeat the Taliban in Afghanistan in a
matter of weeks, a victory that eluded the Soviet Army for a decade. But the
world also watched how quickly American interest and commitment flagged in the
post-conflict reconstruction. America's inability to offer a convincing path to
a better Afghan future led many in the Arab and Muslim world to question
whether the United States could do anything better in Iraq. Perceived apathy
was one reason for the lack of support we received in the run up to "Operation
Iraqi Freedom." It also fed the myth that America cares very little about
what happens to Muslims around the world.
The current
problems the United States is confronting in Iraq, further compounds the notion
that America does not take seriously the problems of Arabs and Muslims. It is
not lost on the rest of the world that when the United States is serious about
something, it is able to follow through. Consider the case of Germany after
WWII, a project we were deeply committed to seeing through to the end. While in
many ways Germany is significantly different than Afghanistan or Iraq, it was
also an easy case: a country with a history of democracy and a culture and
language familiar to many Americans. Nonetheless, the United States kept more
than 200,000 troops within the American sector of Germany. U.S. military
commanders ordered approximately 30,000 war weary soldiers to retrain for
policing duties in what became a U.S. constabulary force. These constabulary
troops were responsible for law and order and border patrol and given new
training in order to police the peace. They were equipped with horses and
motorcycles to tackle their new responsibilities. No such commitment has been
made to Iraq, nor to Afghanistan.
In addition
to contributing security forces, America made a significant economic
contribution to the reconstruction of Germany. Between 1948 and 1952 Washington
committed 8 billion dollars in Marshall Aid, most of it coming in the two years
between 1948 and 1950. This is a far cry from the 1.7 billion dollars that US
officials have stated is the only money American taxpayers will be asked to
contribute to Iraq's reconstruction.
Our failure
to fully commit to nation-building directly empowers our detractors in the
region. It bolsters the arguments of those who say the United States cares
little for Arabs and Muslims and is content to allow them to live in chaos and
deprivation. It provides for the anarchy in which radical groups can thrive. In
Iraq, the post-conflict plan called for a reduction of troops from 150,000 to
30,000 within a few months of the end of combat operations. After reality set
in, the Administration appropriately readjusted its position and extended the
stay of troops serving in Iraq. Had the United States gone in and stated strongly
that 150,000 would stay indefinitely, it would have been a very different
message than the current one, which suggests that we planned badly, and
resistance has been tougher than expected. It also would have allowed America
an earlier withdrawal. History shows that a serious and early commitment to law
and order is necessary to build a functioning economy, a free and fair
political system and a healthy civil society. The reluctance to commit to a
serious law and order campaign from the very beginning and to flood Iraq with
resources has only emboldened opposition and is enticing troublemakers from
around the region to drift towards the fighting in Iraq.
(3)
Focusing on our friends as much as our enemies
America will
not be successful by force alone. While military action is sometimes required,
as it was in the case of Iraq, the United States will draw supporters if it is
engaged in a broad effort to help its friends, not only destroy its enemies.
The social and economic challenges facing the Middle East are tremendous.
Across the region, almost half the population is below the age of 15, economic
growth is sluggish and unemployment is increasing. These are the concerns that
are consuming local leaderships, as well as their populations. One very senior Saudi
official told me in the summer of 2000 that unemployment was the country's
number one national security threat. Serious American attention must be given
to devising policies that help address these mounting concerns.
The
Administration has taken an important first step by requesting $145 million for
the Middle East Partnership Initiative (MEPI), an initiative devoted to
expanding grass roots economic, political and educational opportunities in the
Arab world. But as of yet, there is considerable confusion among local
populations as to how to access it, or how to draw America's attention to
worthy local projects. The embassies do not yet appear to be reaching out to
the local communities and planning seems to be happening mostly in Washington.
MEPI is an important first step. Increased attention must be given to improving
the communication between the embassies and local figures.
The United
States must also think seriously about promoting sounder education as an
integral piece of its foreign policy. The Administration has correctly raised
the issue of Saudi funding for radical Islamic schools and mosques. Such
pressure must continue. But cracking down on this kind of funding is only part
of the solution. Many parents send their children to such schools because they
offer hot meals and lodging, not because of the religious content. America
should be in the business of championing schools that offer skills and
opportunities to local citizens. It requires a long term strategy to wean away
recruits from al-Qa'eda's grip.
(4)
Improving communication channels between Washington and the World
In the wake
of September 11th, considerable attention was given to the fact that the United
States was not mounting a successful public diplomacy campaign and was losing the
battle of hearts and minds to its radical opponents. Unfortunately, attention
to public diplomacy has seemed to dissipate. America's efforts to build
international constituencies must be rejuvenated, not only to better explain
current U.S. policy, but also to transmit back to Washington concerns of the
local populations.
In the lead
up to the war in Iraq, for instance, there was considerable concern in the
Middle East that the United States did not have a serious "day after"
plan. US policy makers appeared unconcerned with the potential of Iraqi
civilian casualties and the effect on neighboring populations if Saddam
released chemical or biological weapons. These very real fears were shrugged
off, rather than seriously considered. Had they been engaged, the US might have
received additional support.
Even where
concerns were exaggerated or misplaced, precious little was done to provide
facts to the contrary. The fear that there would be untold numbers of civilian
casualties came from the belief that tens of thousands of Afghan civilians had
died in the American attack. This number was put forward by the Taliban and
barely refuted by the United States. What the world saw was a notable
callousness toward Muslim citizens. The United States did little to show how
those numbers were inflated. In fact, even now, it is exceedingly difficult to
get estimations of casualties from any branch of the US government.
Another fear
was that if Saddam Hussein used WMD against Americans in Iraq, the deadly
content would spread throughout the region. Again, little was done to show the
scientific unlikeliness of such a scenario. American disregard for Arab life
seemed reinforced. A better communication strategy, one that explains America's
rationale to foreign publics, but also incorporates their concerns, would
significantly help our friends defend their support for us.
The
challenge radical Islamic groups pose to the United States will not simply go
away. To be convinced, one needs only to look at the landscape of current and
future political hot-spots. Afghanistan, Iraq, the Philippians, Indonesia,
Palestine and Sudan all require American attention. In each case, the United
States is likely to side against organized Islamic opposition. In Afghanistan
and Iraq, the United States is already confronted with the thorny question of
how to separate constructive from destructive Islamic opposition. Given
political realities, it will be exceedingly difficult for the United States to
claim it is not engaged in an anti-Muslim crusade.
Failing to
make the case will antagonize a significant portion of the world's population.
PEW's poll results cited above suggested that the antagonism is already
beginning. Avoiding an anti-Islamic crusade (i.e., a clash of civilizations),
must become a principle American foreign policy goal. Ignoring it will not make
the problem go away. It will only ensure that it becomes a pressing problem on
every foreign policy decision maker's agenda.”
To better understand the DOD we should have a look at a report that I have already done about the US Department of Defense. One of our countries top concerns in the world today is our how well defended we are from terrorism and other threats. It is the DOD’s (department of defense) job to make sure America is safe. How is the DOD run? How much does it cost to run? Who is in charge of running it? How successful is it being run? These are a few of the topics I am going to cover in my research paper.
What
exactly is the DOD and what does it do? I believe we can sum this up in a few
quotes from the DOD website. “With… military units tracing their roots to
pre-Revolutionary times, you might say that …[the DOD is] America’s oldest
company.
And if you look at…[it] in business terms, many would say… [it’s] not only
America’s largest company, but its busiest and most successful.” (defenselink.mil/pubs/dod101
1). The DOD began in 1775 with the Navy, Army, and Marine Corps. As America’s
military defense power increased and new institutions were in place the DOD
became more existent. Until 1949 when the DOD was finally established as a part
of our government. (defenselink.mil/pubs/dod101
1) “The [DOD]… directs and controls the
armed forces and assists the president in the direction of the nation's
security.” (encarta.msn.com, par. 2). The DOD utilizes more then 30
million acres of land in its 600,000 different buildings, at over 6,000
different locations. The DOD also has a presence in an estimated 146 countries.
(defenselink.mil/pubs/dod101 1)
How much could an organization like this cost? The DOD has a budget costing around three hundred seventy-one billion dollars and more than two million employees. That is a huge amount of money but it is sometimes difficult to think of that much money so lets put it into perspective. A huge corporation such as Wal-Mart, which has the closest budget to the DOD; has a budget of about two hundred twenty-seven billion dollars and employs about one-point-three million people. (defenselink.mil/pubs/dod101 1)
A particular person does not run the DOD, but a group of people called the National Command Authority. The NCA is the combination of the President and the Secretary of State. They however don’t run the entire show Congress must approve the budget. That budget comes from the taxpayers’ dollars so ultimately without US citizens the DOD couldn’t even exist; but that could be said about our government itself. The DOD chain of command goes from the NCA. Then to the secretary of defense, he/she sends it to the military, which train and equip troops. The secretary of defense also contact the JCS (joint chiefs of staff) and they plan and coordinate a plan of action. Then the unified commands will perform the needed operation. (defenselink.mil/pubs/dod101 1)
How
successful is the department that handles our nations entire defense network?
The first major success is probably that it was created, and that it can
maintain and monitor our nations defenses. One crucial failure would probably
be the 9/11 attacks on New York by the terrorist group Al-Qaeda. The DOD
stepped up to this problem and changed all security precautions to try to keep
something like this from happening again. (defenselink.mil/pubs/dod101
1) However the website where I have cited most of my work from only focuses on
the positives of the DOD and not the negatives. So I had to go to different
websites to find some negatives. One of the more expressed failures would have
to be the ballistic missile defense program. The patriot missiles used in the
Gulf War only hit 9% of the 45 scud missiles; that were engaged. The next would
be the newest THAAD (Theater High Altitude Air Defense system) because out of
the 12 tests it only hit 12% of the time. The low tier weapons (stay within the
atmosphere) perform well but the higher tier (intercept outside earth’s
atmosphere) weapons are a failure. (ceip.org
1) In a different report it states that we will have working missile defense
programs by 2005. Which will be composed of a Patriot Pac-3 system with sensors
in land, air, and space. (washtimes.com 1) Another says that our US
government knew about the 9/11 attacks and failed to take appropriate action.
It was called project Bojinka by the
terrorists. There was even a report about how they would probably target the
world trade center, with an airliner.
So how did something like this happen when we knew about it and should
have been prepared? (mediamonitors.net 1)
I hope that my research paper on a brief overview of the DOD. Has helped you learn more about the DOD. I told you what it does and how it does it. I told you about how much it costs to run the DOD. I told you how the DOD runs and who runs it. I also gave you a few of its success and failures. The DOD has had many successes and failures. I believe it is a much-needed part of our American government. I also believe that rules and regulations should be changed so if we know of a threat in advance we can neutralize it like in the case of project Bojinka.
War is not really a good thing for the economy it got this false identity from WW2 because right after the war the great depression was over. It is true that some get very rich from war and it helps the economy a little. It causes inflation and unemployment that take a very long time to correct. The economy was growing at the same rate as before and after the war so it just needed some time to correct itself. The Vietnam War put our economy into a stagflation, which is the hardest economic obstacle for our Federal economic system. During the 1990’s, which were the most peaceful time of our country in recent years, we had the best economic growth and now we go into the new millennium with war and a shaky economy.
How much did the 9/11 terrorist attacks really cost? Our nation got into a lot of trouble when they tried to figure just how much every person was worth. It turned out that the rich got most of the money the top 15% of the people that died got 86% of the money. This made a lot of people very angry, but this is not really how congress wanted it to happen. The people in the 9/11 attacks also got more money then those who were spouses to soldiers that died in Afghanistan and Iraq. This has created almost a feud between the two groups as to who deserves what. In a worst case scenario a major city would be destroyed like New York a group of economists got together and found out that if we lost most of the New York metropolitan area we would lose about 3% of our national GDP.
Some
people are against putting money into defense saying:
“it may be cheaper, and much more effective,
way to protect American facilities and national interests would be to adopt a
more restrained foreign policy. Instead of being meddler of first resort,
Washington should be the balancer of last resort, intervening only where allied
states are unable to act and the United States has vital or at least serious
interests at stake.” They feel we have problems with terrorist nations because
we are to prone to trying to impose ourselves on other nations. Most of those
who hate America would nevertheless leave us alone if we left them alone. What
makes the United States a target is its willingness to impose itself on other
peoples. As Clinton delicately put it: "Americans are targets of terrorism
in part because we have unique leadership responsibilities in the world."
But Washington does not have "unique leadership
responsibilities." Rather, it asserts such obligations. It chooses to put
Somalia back together. It decides which politician should rule Haiti. It
dictates policy in the Kosovo civil war. It decides that three warring factions
should stay together in Bosnia. It supports a whole series of undemocratic, authoritarian
regimes around the globe. And, of course, it micromanages the ugly, emotional
and endless conflicts in the Middle East.“
(cato.org 1)
[Other critics feel that].
“After much denial, Americans are
finally beginning to admit that we are indeed an imperial nation. What Thomas
Jefferson and other Founding Fathers openly dreamed about two centuries ago has
become reality, and the United States has taken Britain’s place as the seat of
empire, dominating the globe.
What does an empire cost and is that cost worth paying?
The most obvious expense is the Pentagon’s war machine, now costing about $400
billion a year, nearly half the world’s military expenditure. Our $7 trillion
national debt has come largely from past wars, police actions, invasions of
other countries, long-term military occupations and arms races. Interest on
that debt and military spending together take 28 percent of our federal taxes
every year.
Ultimately a nation’s taxable wealth comes from its soil. The United States
could dream of empire because it acquired the greatest natural treasure enjoyed
by any modern nation. We had unparalleled riches in our forests, rivers and
mines. Above all, we had riches in our deep soils, the best on the planet.
Canada and Australia also aspired to empire, but they quickly abandoned those
dreams when it became clear that they lacked the requisite soil. The soils of
ancient Rome, the soils of modern Europe, the soils of China and the soils of
the United States have all allowed empires to grow in those places, but not in
glacier-scoured Canada or in nutrient-poor Australia. Partly because of limited
resources, Canada has only one-tenth of the U.S. population, Australia
one-fifteenth. Through hard effort they have become wealthy countries, but they
have no chance at world empire.
The United States is a nation with incomparable natural advantages, but we are
depleting them rapidly. We cannot pay for the Pentagon’s endless appetite, or
sustain a military presence on every continent, or pay interest on the national
debt without spending those natural resources. Each year we have to pound our
land harder to extract its wealth. A hard-pounded land soon becomes a degraded
land. Environmental degradation at home is the true cost of empire abroad.
In the pursuit of global supremacy, we have polluted every part of our nation.
And now we are told that we must live with that degradation as the price of
glory. We cannot afford to clean up rivers, preserve ancient forest ecosystems,
save native prairie, refrain from mining or oil drilling regardless of the
resulting damage. We have to put up with losing hundreds of millions of tons of
topsoil every year. We have to accept the drenching of our soils with chemicals
to stay on top. If we do not pay those costs, we are told, we will slip
backward and someone else will take our place as the world’s superpower.
Eventually all empires falter and collapse. They don’t deliver on the visionary
promises they make. They fall because they bankrupt themselves and, more often
than not, they bankrupt the environment that supports them.”
(newfarm.org 1)
[Some people have found that we are
starting a role that other countries may follow and list a few examples].
“The debate on a possible pre-emptive war by the United States
against Iraq has so far centered on elaborate cost-benefit equations of how
much it would cost in money, blood and geopolitical influence to topple Saddam
Hussein -- and who would replace him. What has not yet been discussed are the
consequences for global governance if a pre-emptive strike is successful.
Suppose everything goes right, democracy is restored and the Iraqi threat is
removed at low cost (a tall order) -- the American initiative will set an
important precedent, one sure to be invoked by potential imitators.
The first, the widest and the most
dangerous interpretation is that it would legitimate the proposition that
whenever Country A believes, rightly or wrongly, that there is a "clear
and present danger" from Country B, it is entitled to attack first. The
19th-century military historian Carl von Clausewitz claimed that war is a
continuation of foreign policy by other means, and that attack is often the best
defense. A successful U.S. pre-emptive strike against Iraq will, in effect,
reinstate both Clausewitz propositions.
Under this doctrine, Pakistan could
perceive a clear and present danger from India and attack first, or vice versa.
Israel and the Arab states could use the same logic to launch quick first
strikes; for that matter, Iraq could launch a pre-emptive strike against the
United States, on the legitimate pretext that it perceives a clear and imminent
threat from the latter. In fact, an immediate imitator is already manifest:
Last week, Vladimir Putin invoked the Bush doctrine to threaten pre-emptive
action against neighboring Georgia, which he accused of harboring Chechen
rebels.
The 20th century has seen two world
wars, plus countless regional wars. After 1945, the idea was to outlaw war as
an instrument of policy and rely instead on collective security mechanisms. In
addition, the mutually assured destruction theory of deterrence created a
remarkable stability between the superpowers until the collapse of the Soviet
Union. Both parties renounced first strikes.
Legitimating unilateral pre-emptive
war would set back the clock to pre-Second World War parameters and negate most
of the advances in global governance achieved since then.
Let's consider a second, slightly
milder interpretation: that unilateral pre-emptive strikes are fine as long as
they are initiated by a strong power against a much weaker opponent. During the
Cold War, the former Soviet Union possessed frightening weapons of mass
destruction. Russia still does and so does China. Should all these states be
attacked pre-emptively? Pragmatic geopoliticians will answer no; let us just
attack the weaker states. The stronger states can be allowed to get away with
murder. The precedent then would be: It is fine to attack first as long as you
are sure of winning. This notion is almost as dangerous as the first.
The third interpretation is that if
the cause is good, pre-emptive strikes are justified. The "cause" may
be restoring democracy, effecting "regime change" or whatever the
attacking power believes in. We find ourselves on a very slippery slope --
because the justice of the cause is a matter of subjective interpretation. It
could be used by Islamic fundamentalists against the infidels, or by world revolutionaries
against capitalism. Besides, citing "the restoration of democracy" in
the case of Iraq carries the obvious flaw that the United States and others
have never hesitated to back dictatorial regimes (including Saddam Hussein's in
Iraq in the 1980s), if it is in their interest to do so.
The fourth interpretation is that
pre-emptive strikes constitute a privilege that belongs only to the United
States by virtue of its position as sole superpower and, therefore, world
sheriff. This interpretation would be plausible if the United States were to
accept intervening, like the Lone Ranger, to right all wrongs -- if all the
injustices in the world could be corrected by American power.
As distasteful as that might be to
third parties, this form of unilateralism would be at least internally
consistent and might be accepted, if clear rules of engagement were made
explicit.
But the current situation, where
proposed interventions are not only unilateral but entirely conditioned and
motivated by U.S. national interest (rather than global interests), is
obviously not acceptable to either allies or foes of the United States. Rather
than contributing to world order, American unilateralism will severely
destabilize it.
In the end, it is the combination of
"unilateral" and "pre-emptive" that is the dangerous mix.
Unilateral defensive war is still quite acceptable, as when the United States
responded to the unprovoked 9/11 attack originating in Afghanistan.
Multilateral pre-emptive military interventions sanctioned by a legitimate
world body to right obvious wrongs, stop genocides or for general humanitarian
purposes are not only acceptable but desirable -- much like police raids
intended to nip in the bud terrorist or criminal activities. Prevention is a
virtue. But unilateral pre-emptive war in the name of national interest opens
up a Pandora's box much more dangerous that the problem it addresses.
The Westphalian World Order, born of
the 1648 Treaty of Westphalia, entrusted the governance of this planet to the
juxtaposition of a number of national sovereignties. This system is rapidly
becoming obsolete and must be reformed in favor of some forms of
supranationality -- that is, the subordination of national sovereignty to
higher global values.
The reform must involve new and improved
versions of multilateralism, including better intergovernmental institutions.
Until then, the use of force between nations must be sanctioned by a legitimate
world body and cannot be left to the arbitrary self-interest of the current
world heavyweight champion acting solely in its own self-interest.
To do otherwise is to let slip the
dogs of war. And this could make the previous century, with its two world wars,
look like a pacifist's dream.”
(commondreams.org 1)
In conclusion I have unearthed and
obtained an abundance of information that can be used to see; how much this war
on terror will cost. I have given you figures and numbers derived from the
federal government and notable sources. The only problem about measuring the
cost of any conflict is that most variables involved cannot be measured. Such
as human life or depressing emotions that come about from a war or conflict.
These things cannot be measured by a dollar amount. Making it hard to figure in
any terms of any measurement how much it really is going to cost. I have also
given you some insight as to what the money is going to do. I gave arguments
from people pro war on terrorism and people con war on terrorism. I hope that
my report has cleared somewhat cleared up some questions people have about the
war on terrors cost.
Ahmed,
Nafeez. “Did Bush Know? Warning
Signs of 9-11 and Intelligence Failures.” 18 May 2002. Media Monitors Network. 27 Sep. 2003 <http://www.mediamonitors.net/mosaddeq36.html>.
Bandow, Doug. “A Foreign Policy for
Terrorists.” 20 Feb 1999. CATO Institute. 27 Sep 2003
<http://www.cato.org/dailys/02-20-99.html>.
Bronson, Rachel. “Third public hearing of the National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States.” 21 Nov 2003. National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States. 25 Nov 2003 <http://www.9-11commission.gov/hearings/hearing3/witness_bronson.htm>.
Cirincione,
Joseph. “Missile Defense Failures Offer Lessons.”14 July 2000. Carnegie Endowment for International Peace
NON-PROLIFERATION: 27 Sep. 2003 <http://www.ceip.org/programs/npp/brief27.htm>.
"Defense,
Department of." Microsoft® Encarta® Online Encyclopedia. 2003. http://encarta.msn.com
© 1997-2003 Microsoft Corporation. 27 Sep. 2003
<http://encarta.msn.com/encnet/refpages/RefArticle.aspx?refid=761570788>.
“DoD 101: An Introductory Overview of the Department of Defense.” 16 Sep. 2003. Lkd. DefenseLINK – Official Web Site of the U.S. Department of Defense. 27 Sep. 2003 <http://www.defenselink.mil/pubs/dod101/dod101_for_2002.html>.
Dunnigan, James. “The Costs of the War on Terror.” 21 Jan 2003. StragedyWorld.com. 26 Nov 2003 <http://www.strategypage.com/dls/articles/20030121.asp>.
Bush
case on defense plan cites N. Korea.” The Washington Times 27 May 2003.
27 Sep. 2003
<http://www.washtimes.com/national/20030527-124651-5190r.htm>.
Goldstein, Joshua S. “The Real Price of War: How
We Pay for the War on Terror.” 24 Nov 2003. 26 Nov 2003 <
http://realpriceofwar.com/site/>.
Valaskakis, Kimon. “Might Makes Right? Wrong.” 17 Sep 2002. Bell Globemedia Interactive Inc. 26 Nov 2003
<http://www.commondreams.org/views02/0917-05.htm>.
Worster, Donald. “Environmental degradation at home is the cost of empire abroad.” 13 Aug 2003. T H E N E W F A R M – R E G E N E R A T- I V E A G R I C U L T U R E W O R L D W I D E. 26 Nov 2003 <http://www.newfarm.org/depts/gleanings/0803/worster.shtml>.